Abstract-As large scale enterprise computer networks become more ubiquitous, finding the appropriate balance between user convenience and user access control is an increasingly challenging proposition. Suboptimal partitioning of users' access and available services contributes to the vulnerability of enterprise networks. Previous edge-cut partitioning methods unduly restrict users' access to network resources. This paper introduces a novel method of network partitioning superior to the current state-of-the-art which minimizes user impact by providing alternate avenues for access that reduce vulnerability. Networks are modeled as bipartite authentication access graphs and a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm is used to simultaneously minimize the size of large connected components while minimizing overall restrictions on network users. Results are presented on a real world data set that demonstrates the effectiveness of the introduced method compared to previous naive methods.
INTRODUCTION
L ARGE scale enterprise computer networks are becoming ubiquitous and are increasing in complexity. The ease with which users access network resources directly impacts their productivity. Centralized single-sign-on (SSO) systems, such as Kerberos [1] , allow organizations to manage access control on a large scale. However, due to the mechanics of these systems, if user access is granted without consideration for the security of the network as a whole, large portions of the network can become vulnerable to attack by an adversary that can compromise a user's credentials.
The credentials used to access a computer are often stored in a specialized cache on that machine. A variety of methods exist which allow an adversary to retrieve these credentials from a compromised computer [2] . Once the credentials have been obtained, they can be used to access and compromise other computers on the network. This entire process can be applied repeatedly, allowing an intruder to continue to traverse a growing portion of the network.
The most notorious example of exploiting stolen credentials, known as pass-the-hash, abuses the weakness of unsalted password hashes in older networks using Windows NT LAN Manager [3] . However, similar principles make this type of attack possible on modern systems as well, such as Kerberos [4] . Dunagan et al. refer to the process of repeatedly using stolen credentials to access additional computers as an identity snowball attack [2] .
Segmenting the network by the accounts that are authorized to access them improves the resilience of the entire network against such attacks. Modeling a computer network as a graph makes it possible to employ graph partitioning algorithms to achieve this end, traditionally by selecting a set of edges to remove. While effective, those methods do not take advantage of the nature of the computer networks these graphs represent.
This work improves upon network partitioning by using a representation that considers the nature of user authentication. This allows for an approach that more specifically solves for the problem of user access control instead of the more abstract problem of graph partitioning. Computer networks are modeled as graphs consisting of user and computer nodes connected by edges corresponding to authentication events. These networks are partitioned using a technique that leverages a traditional graph partitioning heuristic along with an evolutionary algorithm to produce solutions that protect the network from credential theft attacks without unnecessarily restricting user access to network resources.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The graph partitioning problem and evolutionary algorithms are reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the particular representation used to model authentication networks as well as the details of partitioning these networks. Section 4 discusses previous and related work. Details of the approaches used are explained in Section 5. The experiment performed, including details of the data set used, is detailed in Section 6. Section 7 contains experimental results comparing the various methods. Finally, Sections 8, 9, and 10 comprise discussion, conclusions and future work, respectively.
Graph Partitioning. Given a graph G ¼ ðV; EÞ with the set of vertices V and the set of edges E, a graph partitioning divides the vertices in G into smaller subsets of V . In many applications, desirable partitions are those for which the number (or sum of the weights) of edges in E that connect vertices in different subsets is small. This is usually because the partition is applied to the graph by removing any such edges to disconnect the graph into separate components. Each edge removal typically incurs some cost depending on the specific application, and this overall cost should be minimized. Previous research has shown that partitioning a graph by removing the minimum number (or weight) of edges, even when allowing unbalanced partitions, is an NPhard problem [5] . For many applications, it is sufficient to use heuristics to approximate an optimal graph partition. For these instances, software has been developed to quickly find low cost partitions. The METIS graph partitioning package is an example of such an implementation [6] .
Evolutionary Algorithms (EA). An Evolutionary Algorithm is a biologically inspired generate-and-test, black-box search technique [7] . A population of solutions to a specific problem is randomly generated. During recombination, this population is used to generate offspring by combining portions of donor parent solutions. Offspring are typically subjected to some form of mutation, which is capable of introducing entirely new genetic information, enabling exploration of the search space. Some portion of the population is selected to survive, or continue on to the next generation where the entire process is repeated until some termination criteria is met. The fitness of a solution represents how well it solves the problem at hand. Selection pressure, which generally involves favoring higher fitness when selecting solutions to produce offspring or survive into later generations, encourages exploitation of genetic information known to contribute to higher fitness.
In a Multi-Objective Evolutionary Algorithm (MOEA), a single fitness value is replaced by a set of (often competing) objective values. MOEAs, such as the Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm-II (NSGA-II) [8] , compare relative solution quality using a dominance relation instead of a simple fitness comparison. One solution dominates another if it is at least as good for all objectives and strictly superior for at least one objective. Instead of returning the single best solution found, MOEAs typically return the set of the best non-dominated solutions; this set is referred to as the Pareto frontier.
BIPARTITE AUTHENTICATION GRAPHS (BAG)
The computers on a network and the user accounts that access them can be naturally represented as two independent sets of nodes in a bipartite authentication graph [9] . An edge in this graph connects a user node to a computer node and represents an occurrence where the user's authentication credentials are used to access the computer. This access can be direct (e.g., a user logging into a workstation) or indirect (e.g., through SSH or a remote desktop session).
Example 1. The BAG in Fig. 1 contains the set of user nodes fU1; U2; U3g, the set of computer nodes fC1; C2; C3; C4g and the set of authentication edges fðU1; C1Þ; ðU1; C2Þ; ðU1; C3Þ; ðU1; C4Þ; ðU2; C3Þ; ðU2; C4Þ; ðU3; C4Þg. This graph representation makes it possible to identify the portions of a network which are vulnerable to credential theft attacks. For example, if the computer C1 in Fig. 1 is compromised, the credentials for user U1 could be stolen. The existing edges of the BAG indicate that the credentials for user U1 can also be used to access computers C2, C3, and C4. As a result, an adversary armed with the stolen credentials for user U1 would also be able to gain access to these additional computers. The same exploits used to steal credentials from computer C1 can then be repeated on these new targets allowing the intruder to continue to traverse the network.
Under normal circumstances, a computer's cache would only contain a subset of the credentials used to access the machine due to limits on the cache size or credentials being periodically removed. Since it is not always possible to determine which credentials are present at a particular time, assuming all the previously used credentials are still in the cache gives an upper limit on the potential risk when the machine is compromised. If the edges of a BAG incident to a given computer represent the authentication credentials assumed to be currently stored in that computer's cache, then upon compromise, the adversary could have access to the credentials of all adjacent user nodes in the BAG. If any of these users are also adjacent to other computer nodes in the BAG, then their stolen credentials can be used by the adversary to access those machines. By repeating this process, the adversary can continue traversing the connected component of the BAG compromising a growing portion of the network.
BAG Partitioning
Large connected components in the BAG represent a greater potential for the damage that can be done with repetitive credential theft attacks. Reducing the size of the connected components would limit the assets an adversary could gain access to after an initial compromise. One straightforward method of disconnecting components in a graph is to use a traditional edge removal partition algorithm. Removing a set of edges to split the large connected components of a BAG translates to revoking the ability of certain users to access a subset of their adjacent computers.
Example 2. Fig. 2 shows the BAG in Fig. 1 after applying the partition: edgesToRemove ¼ fðU1; C3Þ; ðU1; C4Þg, which separates the BAG into the following connected components: fU1; C1; C2g; fU2; U3; C3; C4g. This partition is translated to the network by revoking user U1's access to computers C3 and C4. If an adversary compromises the computer C1 and steals the credentials for user U1, the intruder will no longer be able to use those stolen credentials to access C3 and C4 as a result of this partitioning. Assuming the user had a good reason for accessing the computer, this restriction could prevent the user from utilizing necessary resources. It is possible that the user could be given access to a suitable replacement computer, but this would require information about available network resources as well as the purpose of the original access. An alternative solution would be to give that user a second account with separate credentials that would be used to access a subset of the computers they use. In the BAG, this would split a user node into two nodes, each connected to a subset of the computers to which the original node was adjacent.
Example 3. Fig. 3 shows the BAG in Fig. 1 after splitting the user node U1 with the following scheme: userSplits ¼ fU1 : fC1; C2g; fC3; C4gg, which separates the BAG into the following connected components: fU1a; C1; C2g; fU1b; U2; U3; C3; C4g. This partition is translated to the network by replacing user U1's authentication credentials with two new sets of credentials. With the first set of credentials (U1a), U1 can access computers C1 and C2. U1 can use the second set (U1b) to access computers C3 and C4.
This technique can be used to disconnect a critical path between two large components in the network, while still allowing the user to access the needed computer resources. The process can also be extended to split the user into more than two accounts, although this could quickly become cumbersome for a user who accesses more than the average number of computers, such as a network administrator. In order to prevent partition solutions that require a user to manage an unreasonable number of credentials, a limit on the number of splits per user node can be specified. This limit would vary depending on the application, or could be omitted entirely to allow unlimited user node splitting. If this limit is required by an application, some number of edge removals may still be warranted to ensure disconnecting a critical path in the BAG. Example 4. Fig. 4 shows the BAG in Fig. 1 after applying the following partition: edgesToRemove ¼ fðU2; C4Þg; userSplits ¼ fU1 : ffC1; C2g; fC3g; fC4ggg, separating the BAG into the following partitions: fU1a; C1; C2g; fU1b; U2; C3g; fU1c; U3; C4g.
For the purpose of partitioning the BAG, a similar node splitting process can also be performed on the computer nodes. Translating such node splits to the real network is not as simple as giving a user a second set of authentication credentials, however. A computer node split could be implemented by adding another computer to the network and requiring a subset of the original computer's users to instead make use of the new machine. If the computer node in question represents a server running virtual machines, a split could also take the form of an additional instance of the virtual environment being run with access restrictions to each instance. This approach might be more feasible because it does not require the allocation of additional hardware, but the increase in simultaneous virtual environments would introduce further computational overhead. Because these implementation methods might not be practical for a particular computer network, this research focuses on partitions that are limited to splitting user nodes.
Removing an edge and splitting a user node in the BAG both translate to an impact on a user's ability to efficiently access the resources they need to perform their work. These measures should only be applied if they make a significant impact on the size of the connected components in the graph. An ideal solution will strike a balance between the impact on the users and the reduction in the size of the connected components.
Since the security needs of a particular network vary based on its purpose, presenting a single partitioning solution might not be adequate. An approach that produces multiple possible solutions with various objective trade-off values would allow a network administrator to choose a partition solution that meets their needs in terms of security and efficiency. Multi-objective evolutionary algorithms, such as NSGA-II [8] , excel at this type of problem where it is not possible to determine the relative value between two or more conflicting objectives a priori.
BAG Partition Application
Conceptually, applying a BAG partition solution to the actual network is a straightforward process. When a user node split is prescribed by a partition, the associated account is replaced by multiple new accounts, each with access to a subset of that user's originally accessed machines. Should an adversary compromise one of these computers and obtain the user's credentials, they will not be able to use those credentials to gain access to computers in a different subset, possibly disconnecting their path to additional network assets.
An obvious way to translate edges removed by the BAG partition is to revoke the associated user's access to a computer entirely. However, this drastic solution may not always be practical. Compared to traditional edge removal partitioning algorithms, partition solutions involving user node splits tend to require dramatically fewer edge removals. As a result, it is more feasible to explore alternatives when edge removals prove necessary. The suggested edge removals indicate critical paths between connected components in the BAG. If these connections cannot be removed for practical reasons, they could instead be targeted with high-fidelity traffic monitors to detect adversaries traversing the network. Another option, as previously discussed, is to allocate a suitable replacement computer for the user that results in smaller connected components. Alternatively, a small number of user nodes, such as those corresponding to network administrators, could be split more times than is normally allowed for a regular user.
RELATED WORK
This work is related to other methods which use a graph representation of possible avenues of attack against network vulnerabilities. In particular, this work directly extends previous research that introduced BAGs and discussed how they can be used to model the vulnerability of a network when adversaries are able to steal user credentials [10] . Previous related work in combating this type of attack usually takes one of two forms: identifying and responding to network intrusion [11] , or partitioning the network by controlling user access to limit the access an adversary can gain with a set of stolen credentials [2] . This work focuses on the latter by creating partitions of the graph network representation and translating these partitions into network policies.
Attack graphs have traditionally been used to visualize potential paths of attack that exploit a variety of system vulnerabilities in a network [12] . Because attack graphs highlight network vulnerabilities, they serve as an important tool for identifying when an attack is taking place as well as preventing possible attacks altogether. Their value as a security tool has prompted work in automatically generating them from network data [13] , [14] , as well as visualizing them for large networks [15] . A BAG can be viewed as an attack graph that focuses on credential stealing attack potential. Because of their singular purpose, BAGs can be constructed without requiring information about the individual vulnerabilities present on the networked systems. Since this work is concentrated on limiting the damage of these types of attacks, BAGs are used in favor of traditional attack graphs.
The security metrics by which attack graphs are measured have also received a lot of attention. Many look at characteristics of possible paths in the attack graph that reach some predesignated goal. Examples include the length of the shortest path [12] , the number of paths [16] , and the average length of paths [17] . These methods are difficult to apply to the problems considered in this research, because the goal of the attacks being considered is not reaching an individual machine, but compromising the largest possible portion of the network. A more relevant measure is the Network Compromise Percentage (NCP) metric described in [18] , which calculates the percentage of network assets that can be compromised by an attack.
Previous work introduced the use of BAGs and examined the effect of removing high degree nodes on the size of connected components [9] . This simple approach can reduce the size of the connected components, but is difficult to translate to an actual computer network, since the removal of the node would correspond to disabling a user account or removing a computer from the network. More sophisticated approaches exist, such as Heat-ray, which finds sparse cut partitions in an attack graph [2] . This method leverages traditional attack graphs as well as feedback from a network administrator to suggest security configuration changes that are easier to apply to the actual network. The solution presented in this work does not rely on repeated interaction with an administrator, but instead produces a variety of possible security configuration solutions. The administrator can then select from these options the solution that best suits the specific security needs of their network. Also, since this approach does not rely on traditional attack graphs, it can be applied even when information about present system vulnerabilities is not available and cannot be collected.
Instead of limiting an adversary's ability to traverse the network through the use of partitioning, intrusion detection systems aim to identify the adversary's presence on a network as the attack is taking place [11] . This approach generally relies on either matching known attack signatures [19] or by identifying abnormal behavior by comparison to normal or known legitimate activity [20] . There are examples of evolutionary algorithms being applied to improve the performance of intrusion detection systems [21] . The work presented in this paper also leverages the strengths of an evolutionary algorithm, but serves as more of a mitigation technique that does not rely on being able to identify an attack in real time to be effective.
This work relies on advances in efficient graph partitioning. Due to the large size of the graphs involved, finding the optimal partition is not feasible. Multi-level graph partitioning is a widely used approach to approximating low-cost graph partitions [22] . The process approximates the input graph using a smaller, easier to partition version, then maps the simple partition solution back to the original graph. Several well-known graph partition software packages implement multi-level schemes, such as METIS [6] , JOSTLE [23] , Scotch [24] , and DiBaP [25] . Unlike these general purpose graph partition solutions, this work leverages problem specific knowledge to produce superior partitions specifically for authentication graphs.
There are many examples of evolutionary computation techniques being used to find approximate minimum graph partitions [26] , [27] . The Karlsruhe Fast Flow Partitioner Evolutionary (KaFFPaE) leverages the inherent parallelizability of evolutionary algorithms to evolve graph partitions on a distributed system [28] . Soper et al. introduced an evolutionary search algorithm that makes use of a multilevel heuristic for crossover to generate high quality graph partitions [29] . Benlic and Hao developed a multilevel memetic algorithm for the k-way graph partitioning problem [30] . These approaches are similar in that they each assess the quality of a partition solely by determining the cost of removing the necessary edges. The work presented in this paper considers this cost as well, along with the cost of splitting user nodes. Unlike the mentioned approaches, this work does not require the number of desired partitions to be specified a priori. Instead, a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm is used to produce a set of partition solutions with a variety of partition sizes while minimizing the cost of applying the partition.
The approach presented in this work is not intended to be a stand-alone solution to computer network security. Instead, it is intended to provide an additional component in a multi-layer defense system. It should be combined with traditional network hardening practices, such as firewall configuration, software security patch maintenance, as well as utilizing anti-virus and intrusion detection systems. Even with these implementations in place, not all compromises can be prevented. It is in these cases where partitioning the network by user access can mitigate the damage potential of credential theft attacks when they do occur. Modeling the network with a BAG allows this partitioning to be done and only requires information on authentication events, which can be collected easily on enterprise networks employing a single-sign-on system. Using a multi-objective approach means that the network administrator will be presented with an assortment of security configuration change solutions, from which an option can be implemented that meets the security needs of their particular network.
METHODOLOGY
Three methods of partitioning BAGs are considered. The first is a naive method previously introduced that iteratively removes the highest degree node from the graph [9] . The second method uses the METIS software package [6] to find a variety of edge-cut partitions of the input BAG. The final approach leverages the strength of the METIS partition algorithm, but improves upon the result by using an evolutionary algorithm to evolve partition solutions consisting of edge removals and user splits from a population of randomly generated partitions.
Naive Iterative Node Removal
The naive algorithm defined in Algorithm 2 starts with the input BAG and iteratively selects the highest degree node and removes it from the BAG, which also removes all edges incident to that node. Fig. 1 with a computerComponentLimit of 2 will select the highest degree node (user node U1) for removal along with all of its incident edges. The maximum number of computer nodes in any connected component will then be 2 and the algorithm will terminate. Fig. 5 shows the result of this process.
Algorithm 2. Naive Partition: Repeatedly selects and removes a node of maximum degree from the graph until the maximum number of computer nodes in any connected component is less than computer ComponentLimit
while GCCCðBAGÞ > computerComponentLimit do n highest degree node in BAG BAG:removeNodeðnÞ
METIS
Algorithm 3 uses METIS' k-way partitioning to partition the input BAG. The algorithm assigns each node in the BAG a partition label ranging from 1 to k. Any edge that connects nodes that differ in partition labels is removed unless doing so would completely disconnect a user from the graph. A set of partition solutions are created by using a variety of k values to partition the same BAG. Example 6. Fig. 6 shows a possible partitioning of the BAG from Fig. 1 using the method described in Algorithm 3 for a k value of 3. The labels assigned by METIS are shown following the node labels. The edges ðU1; C3Þ, ðU1; C4Þ and ðU2; C4Þ are removed by the algorithm, because nodes U1, U2 and C4 all have different label assignments (1, 2 and 3, respectively). For the purposes of this example, user node U3 was assigned a label of 1 to illustrate that it will not be disconnected from computer node C4, because this would completely disconnect U3 from the BAG.
Evolutionary Algorithm
A population of partition solutions is evolved using the Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II. NSGA-II has been applied to multi-objective graph partitioning previously, with promising results [27] . 
Initialization
For each individual partition solution, a set of user nodes to be split is sampled from all user nodes uniformly. A k value is randomly generated from a configurable range of possible partition labels.
Recombination
Two new child partition solutions are created from two parent solutions. One child receives its k value from the first parent and the other child copies the value from the second parent. The usersToSplit sets for the children are created by iterating over an ordered list of user nodes. This list is divided by a configurable number of crossover points that are determined randomly. The pair of children is matched to the pair of parents so that the first parent contributes to the usersToSplit set of one child, and the second parent contributes to the other. For each user node iteration, if the donor parent's usersToSplit set contains that user node, the user node is also added to the associated child's usersToSplit set. Whenever a crossover point is encountered, the matching of parent to child solutions is reversed so that each child begins copying the usersToSplit set of the alternate parent. 
Mutation
A new partition solution has a configurable probabilistic chance to randomly increment or decrement its k value within the valid limit. Each user node also has a chance of being mutated by adding it to the solution's usersToSplit set if it is not already present or removing it otherwise.
Evaluation
In order to determine the quality of a solution, the partition is used as input to the procedure defined in Algorithm 4. A mapping is created that stores the adjacent computer nodes for each user in the solution's set of user nodes (usersToSplit). These user nodes are then removed from the graph and METIS' k-way partitioning algorithm is applied to resulting graph as described in Section 5.2. For each removed user node, the list of adjacent computers is grouped by the partition assignments produced by the METIS partition. For each resulting group, a new user node is added and then connected to the computer nodes in that group. If the number of groups exceeds the maximum splits per user, the smallest groups are simply truncated resulting in additional edge removals.
Algorithm 4. Partitions BAG using a set of users. Stores a mapping of the computers adjacent to users in usersToSplit then removes these user nodes. Uses METIS to partition the resulting graph. The adjacent computer lists are then partitioned by splitUserNode. The user nodes in usersToSplit are then added back to the graph as split user nodes, connecting them to the original user's adjacent computer nodes in such a way that minimizes the size of connected components in the BAG 
Termination
The consolidation ratio metric described in [31] is used to detect convergence. An archive of the non-dominated solutions discovered by NSGA-II is updated periodically during evolution. The update is performed every ten generations to reduce the likelihood of premature convergence detection, as suggested by the authors of the method. When the percentage of solutions that remain non-dominated in the archive exceeds a configurable limit, the evolution is terminated. Fig. 1 . The labels assigned by METIS are shown following the original node labels. A dashed line indicates an edge that has been removed because the endpoints have differing labels. The edge ðU3; C4Þ is not removed because this would completely disconnect user node U3.
Objectives
Two objectives are used to compare the quality of evolved partition solutions:
User Impact. The sum of the weight of the edges removed from the BAG, plus the total number of splits performed on user nodes in the BAG. Splitting a user into two nodes counts as a single user split, splitting a user into three nodes counts as two user splits, etc. In a practical application, it might not be appropriate to simply sum these two values. Instead, an administrator might choose to make them separate objectives, or scale the two values to indicate the relative difficulty of applying one option over the other. The simplest approach of using the unweighted sum of the two values is chosen in this work to make the results easier to interpret.
Average Network Compromise Percentage (ANCP). A computer node's Network Compromise Percentage (NCP) is the number of computer nodes in the same connected component, divided by the number of computer nodes in the entire BAG; this corresponds to the percentage of computers that can be reached if the initial computer is compromised and used as a launching point for an unmitigated credential theft attack. Note that since each computer in a connected component has the same NCP value, they can be calculated simultaneously for entire components. The Average Network Compromise Percentage objective value for a solution is the average NCP of all of the computer nodes in the BAG after the partition is applied.
EXPERIMENT
Authentication data from the network at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for a month of regular activity is used to construct a BAG [32] . The graph is shown in Fig. 8a and contains 9 ,924 user nodes, 14,822 computer nodes and 106,693 authentication edges. The largest of the 201 connected components contains 9,724 of the user nodes, 14,608 of the computer nodes and 106,479 of the edges. To examine the impact of the input graph size on the quality of the partitioning, as well as demonstrate the generality of the approach, a series of BAGs are also randomly generated and partitioned. In order to ensure that these random graphs still resemble enterprise computer networks, they are generated using user and computer node degree distributions that are similar to those found in the LANL network data set. Fig. 7 shows just how similar these degree distributions are. The horizontal shift of the curves is the result of the increasing number of nodes in the BAG, which increases the number of nodes with specific degree values as well as the maximum possible degree.
The LANL network data set does not contain any information about the relative value of each computer asset or the importance of any given authentication event. For this reason, all computer nodes and authentication edges are assumed to be equivalent and are given unit weight. If a network administrator did have some knowledge about the relative difficulty, or user impact of implementing an authentication removal, the weight of the corresponding authentication edge could be increased or decreased to discourage or encourage the likelihood of removing that edge, respectively. The additional effort of constructing a weighted BAG a priori can be minimized by assuming unit weight for most edges and only adjusting the weight of a small subset of important edges.
To investigate the impact of varying weight edges, a copy of the LANL network BAG is generated with random edge weights. Since METIS requires integer edge weights, the weights are taken uniform randomly from f0; 1; . . . ; 100g. When evaluating a partition solution, these edge weights are divided by 50 so that the mean edge weight is still one, making a direct comparison between the weighted and unweighted cases easier.
The parameters used for the NSGA-II approach are given in Table 1 . To conform to standard NSGA-II, the value for Number of Offspring is set equal to the Population size and the Crossover Probability is set to 100 percent. The Minimum k value is set to 1 to allow solutions that only employ user node splits and do not use METIS to remove edges. The values for Population Size, Number of Crossover Points, Convergence Consolidation Ratio, Mutation Rate and Maximum k were selected using a random-restart steepest-ascent hill climbing search algorithm. The algorithm initializes with a randomly chosen value for each parameter and runs thirty experimental runs to convergence using those parameter values. To determine the relative quality of each configuration, the results they produce are compared using the technique described in [33] , which is explained in Section 7. For comparison, both the naive and METIS approaches are also used to partition each BAG. Unlike NSGA-II, these methods produce only a single partitioning solution each time they are run. To generate a population of solutions using the naive approach, the algorithm is repeatedly run with different values for the computerComponentLimit input parameter. Initially, the computerComponentLimit is set to the original BAG's Largest Computer Component Size value, then it is decremented for each repetition until it reaches 1. Alternatively, the METIS approach is repeatedly applied with increasing values of the k input parameter. The initial value of k is set to 2 to produce a bisection, then incremented with each iteration until further increases in k no longer change the output BAG (around k ¼ 2,500). Fig. 8 shows the BAG created using the LANL network authentication data, along with three partitioned versions of the graph, one for each partitioning approach described in Section 5. Fig. 9 shows the final objective values from 30 experimental runs using NSGA-II on a randomly generated BAG as well as the LANL network BAG. The horizontal and vertical axes measure the level of User Impact and the Average Network Compromise Percentage, respectively. The dashed line is a locally weighted regression line. The final objective values of a sample set of evolved partition solutions to the unweighted LANL network BAG from the NSGA-II process are listed in Table 2 . Fig. 10 shows the improvements in the Pareto frontier during an example run of NSGA-II. Since both objectives are positive values being minimized, improvements travel towards the origin. A new Pareto frontier is added every ten generations and is a darker shade than the previous generations. The difference in areas between neighboring Pareto frontiers shows that a lot of improvement is found in early generations, but this improvement slows in later generations as the algorithm nears convergence.
RESULTS
The weighted regression lines of the NSGA-II results for various input BAGs are compared to those achieved by both the naive approach and METIS' k-way partitioning in Fig. 11. Fig. 12 compares the required execution time of each method, including a brute-force search for the Pareto optimal set of partitions for sufficiently small BAGs. The comparisons of the objective values achieved for these small BAGs are omitted, because both the NSGA-II and METIS approaches are able to find optimal partitions for these trivial applications. Although the NSGA-II approach produces consistently superior partition solutions for the non-trivial BAGs, the method also takes significantly longer to converge than the less-informed methods, especially as the size of the BAG grows. Fig. 13 shows a comparison of the objective values achieved by each method when applied to the randomly weighted LANL network BAG.
A statistical comparison method for multi-objective optimizers described by Knowles and Corne is used to compare the results of the NSGA-II approach against the naive and METIS methods [33] . This evaluation method determines the portion of the trade-off curve each approach statistically outperforms the alternative. Table 3 shows the pairwise comparison results of this process.
DISCUSSION
Despite the fact that the naive approach is unrestricted in its ability to completely disconnect user nodes from the BAG, it is not surprising to see that it performs so poorly. The method seeks to remove the maximum number of edges at each iteration, leading to extremely high levels of user impact with no regard for the improvement to security. However, it provides a very simple method to use as a baseline for comparison. Because the METIS approach relies on a low-cost partition heuristic, it significantly outperforms the naive method at all levels of user impact. As the number of nodes in the BAG increases, this performance gap continues to widen. The NSGA-II approach, with the additional capability to perform user node splits, further improves over the METIS method. The results in Table 2 show several solutions that reduce the Average Network Compromise Percentage by an order of magnitude without a single edge removal. The majority of the evolved solutions have less than a hundred edge removals, which suggests that the only edges removed are the result of the cap on the number of times a user node can be split. A transition is apparent at a User Impact level of 14,962, where the cost of edges removed increases dramatically as the NSGA-II approach begins to rely more heavily on METIS to supplement user node splits with additional edge removals. The effect of this combination is dramatic, and further edge removals lead to the ANCP decreasing by yet another order of magnitude.
It is interesting to note that although there are many solutions with a high number of user splits and few edge removals, the opposite case is not present. This highlights the limitations of partitioning methods that are restricted to edge removals. User node splits, when they can be implemented, are a far more effective method of disconnecting the large connected components of a BAG. Table 3 shows that regardless of the number of nodes in the BAG, NSGA-II is statistically superior to both of the less-informed methods for the vast majority of the trade-off space between User Impact and ANCP. The inclusion of weighted edges also has no apparent effect on the performance improvement of the NSGA-II approach. This is encouraging, since a practical application is likely to involve some authentication edges that would be more difficult to remove. The naive method performs slightly better than the METIS approach in this comparison. This is the result of the region with extremely high User Impact values, which can be seen as the right-most tails of the plots in Fig. 11 . Unlike the METIS and NSGA-II methods, the naive approach is unrestricted in its ability to completely disconnect user nodes from the BAG. However, the fact that the naive method performs so well in this region is of little interest, since it is unlikely that any of these partition solutions could be applied in a practical application.
In exchange for superior partition solution quality, the NSGA-II approach requires significantly more execution time, as can be seen in Fig. 12 . The steep increase in the execution time of the brute-force search is a result of the combinatorial explosion in the size of the search space as the number of nodes in the BAG increases. NSGA-II mitigates this cost increase, but still typically requires more than an order of magnitude increase in computation time compared to the less-informed methods. NSGA-II converges within a few hours for the entire LANL network BAG, which is likely to be insignificant compared to the time required to The shaded columns are the objective values used during the evolution. implement the security configuration changes recommended by the evolved partition solutions, especially if this implementation is done manually.
CONCLUSIONS
Credential theft attacks pose a serious security risk to large enterprise networks, especially those utilizing centralized authentication systems. Modeling a computer network as a BAG makes it easy to identify the potential damage of such attacks. Traditional graph partitioning methods can be used on these graphs to suggest security configuration changes that restrict the ability of adversaries to compromise large portions of the network. However, these methods do not leverage the problem specific knowledge of the nature of user authentication. Our approach exploits this knowledge and utilizes the strengths of multi-objective evolutionary optimization to produce a collection of dramatically superior solutions, which at various levels of user impact, significantly reduce potential damage of a credential theft attack on the network. This presents the end user with a choice of solutions that do not excessively restrict users, while still minimizing the network vulnerability.
FUTURE WORK
The method proposed in this paper produces high quality partitions that have obvious translations to network policies. The application of these policy changes is currently left to the end user. Alternatively, the application process could be automated to periodically update user access controls, especially as a complement to a centralized authentication system. This could give a computer network the ability to adaptively self-regulate the balance between user convenience and network security. The concept could also extend beyond user access control by evolving configurations for systems using Software-Defined Networking [34] . The choice to restrict the splitting of nodes to only user account nodes was made for generality, because implementing computer node splits might not be feasible for a given network. However, for large enterprise networks it is common for any given network service (e.g., DNS) to be run alone on a virtual machine. This setup could make it possible to implement computer node splits by duplicating virtual machines. Some subset of the users which accessed the original network service would have their access revoked and moved to the new virtual machine to properly partition the network. Because this method of node splitting differs greatly from that used to split user nodes, measuring the impact of splitting computer nodes would likely require the addition of another objective. This would increase the complexity of the problem, but for situations where this approach is feasible, the addition of computer node splits could possibly provide higher quality network partitions with an even lower impact on the users.
Use of network services in large enterprise environments is often facilitated by load balancing systems. While these systems increase efficiency, they also increase the damage potential of credential theft exploits since they tend to create large, highly connected network components. BAG partitions could instead be used to control access to these network services. For instance, instead of balancing accesses by all network users across five email servers, the users could be divided into five partitions, each with their own dedicated email server. This would prevent an adversary from using the servers to gain obviously unnecessary access across the network. Incorporating BAG partitioning into resource distribution would still serve to reduce the load on network resources, but would also mitigate the potential damage of intruders traversing the network with stolen credentials.
While the method proposed in this paper takes advantage of the nature of user authentication, it does so without considering why the users access specific computers on the network. The purpose of each access, such as retrieving an email or querying a database stored on the network, could be represented within the BAG as edge descriptions. This additional knowledge could allow for the reallocation of network resources when a critical edge must be removed to partition the network. If another computer within the user's current connected network component can fulfill that purpose, then an edge can be added to the BAG to further reduce the impact on that user without increasing the size of that partition. If no such computer exists within the current component, then the algorithm could consider adding an edge that would connect to a small partition that contains a computer that can meet the user's needs, thus avoiding the impact on the user while minimizing the effect on the network vulnerability.
The implementation in this paper takes as input a static BAG that is generated from past network data. The generated solutions are specifically tailored to the input graph, but the evolution can be a time consuming process for large networks, as seen in Fig. 12 . This process is suitable for relatively stable networks, but could be too cumbersome for networks that are extremely dynamic. An alternative approach could be to develop a partitioning algorithm tailored to the particular network by using an off-line learning hyper-heuristic [35] . For example, genetic programming could be used to evolve heuristics that efficiently generate new partitions. This approach would require a significant amount of setup time initially evolving partitioning programs, but could produce solutions that quickly produce high quality partitions. Cursory experimentation with alternative multi-objective evolutionary algorithms, such as PESA-II [36] and SPEA2 [37] , produced similar results when allowed to run to convergence on the BAG partitioning problem. However, it is possible that other optimization techniques, such as multi-objective variations of particle swarm optimization [38] or simulated annealing [39] , might improve upon the resulting partition quality.
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